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Abstract. Epistemology and logic are essential to Philosophical Practice, although in 
Practical Philosophy congresses and literature they are rarely addressed. Philosophical 
practitioners play an important role in enhancing their clients' epistemological skills. 
Those skills are important for discerning issues involving valid knowledge and truth in 
everyday life. A virtue epistemology, which privileges intellectual virtues instead of 
particular beliefs, is more suitable to the Philosophical Practice setting than other 
epistemologies. As intellectual virtues are moral virtues, the moral role of Philosophical 
Practice is furthered by an epistemology of virtues.  
Keywords. Epistemology, intellectual virtue, moral virtue, Philosophical Practice. 
 
Resumen. La epistemología y la lógica son esenciales para la Filosofía Aplicada, aunque 
en los congresos y literatura de Filosofía Aplicada sean tratadas con poca frecuencia. Los 
orientadores filosóficos juegan un rol importante en mejorar las habilidades 
epistemológicas de sus clientes. Estas habilidades son importantes para discernir asuntos, 
puesto que proporcionan tanto un conocimiento como una verdad válidas para la vida 
cotidiana. Una epistemología de las virtudes, la cual da privilegio a las virtudes 
intelectuales sobre las creencias particulares, es más adecuada para el escenario de la 
Filosofía Aplicada que otras epistemologías. Como las virtudes intelectuales son virtudes 
morales, el rol moral de la Filosofía Aplicada es ampliado gracias a una epistemología de 
las virtudes.   





Epistemology is one of the most representative and professional fields of 
philosophy. It is common knowledge that it has been traditionally 
concerned with two major questions, what is knowledge? And what can 
we know? And that these questions about the nature and scope of 




knowledge quickly led to others1. Yet epistemology is also a practical 
discipline for in everyday life we have to address epistemological issues, 
such as, what is the basis of my decision to trust my doctor? Should I take 
this trip although astrology says that Scorpios should avoid traveling this 
week? Should I cling to my view that all women are stupid and deem a 
man or a lesbian a woman who is not so? Should I take this umbrella 
although the weather news said it would not rain? Should I hold to the 
view that one invites illnesses from the cosmos, that what goes around 
comes around, and that only my wishes create the world? The problem is 
not so much with these beliefs, as with the question: how I have come to 
such a view and whether that process was a sound basis for the view. As 
these examples show our intellectual lives are not devoted exclusively to 
acquiring beliefs; we also are concerned with maintaining, 
communicating and applying our beliefs to practical affairs. David 
Solomon rightly observes that 'just as moral philosophers find themselves 
asking epistemological questions, epistemologists are centrally concerned 
with questions about our practical life. … the central problems of 
normative epistemology are problems about what to do.' (Solomon 2003, 
p. 60).  
Epistemological virtues such as intellectual carefulness, 
perseverance, humility, vigor, flexibility, intellectual courage, and 
thoroughness, and the virtues opposed to wishful thinking, obtuseness 
and conformity, are required on a day to day basis. Intellectual virtues are 
privileged by a virtue epistemology. I believe that this sort of 
epistemology, which addresses the cognitive set-up of the agent rather 
than episodes of cognitive activity in isolation – to use Solomon’s apt 
                                                          
1 Other epistemic questions are, assuming that knowledge is superior to mere 
opinion, what is it that distinguishes the two? What makes knowledge 'justified' 
or 'warranted'? A related question concerns the structure of knowledge: is 
knowledge like a pyramid, with a sure foundation supporting the remaining 
edifice? Or is knowledge more like a raft, with all parts of the structure tied 
together in relations of mutual support? More generally: what is the nature of the 
mind-world relation that constitutes knowing rather than merely believing? 
Given that knowledge involves a mind representing the world, how must mind 
and world be related for knowledge of the world to be possible? 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 2, 2011, pp. 41-65  
EPISTEMOLOGY AS A PRACTICAL ACTIVITY 43 
characterization - is more suitable for furthering adequate thinking within 
Philosophical Practice.  
After introducing epistemology as a practical activity, I suggest that 
a virtue epistemology is more suitable than other epistemologies in 
general, and especially for Philosophical Practice. I then probe the history 
of intellectual virtues along with their motivations and their relationship 
with moral virtues, and propose ways in which intellectual virtues may be 
furthered within the Philosophical Practice. 
 
 
Epistemology as a practical activity 
 
Philosophical Practice is valuable in many areas yet in only a few it is 
indispensable. It is indispensable when no one else does what Practical 
Philosophers do, but more so when no one else can do what those 
philosophers do. One area in which philosophers are indispensable is 
moral education, a view I have defended elsewhere (Amir 2005a; 2005b; 
2009b), the other is critical thinking. Philosophers have been trained for 
clearer thinking on issues that have immediate relevance for everyday 
life, in contradistinction to theoretical mathematicians, for example, 
whose thinking does not have such relevance. It is also an area in which 
philosophers operate according to their credentials in a way that is not 
disputed by others disciplines, for Philosophy can hardly be differentiated 
from critical thinking.  
Any introductory book on philosophy explains what all 
Philosophical Practitioners know well. Philosophy teaches 
 
to weigh up positions, beliefs, and arguments, to ask whether there are good 
reasons for holding a belief or position, whether reasons that are put forward in 
support of them are adequate or relevant, and whether the arguments being 
presented conform to principles of sound reasoning. To question beliefs and 
positions that have become closed and dogmatic, to show up the limits of such 
thinking, its failure or inability to deal with certain facts, considerations or 
arguments, and to open the way to thinking differently (Falzon 2007, pp. 204-
241)  
 
Critical thinking provides us with a way of defending ourselves against 
manipulation and control by others. When we become self-critical in this 




way, we are no longer simply at the mercy of whatever others tell us to 
believe. We no longer take things at face value. We can critically weigh 
up the positions being presented to us to see whether there are good 
reasons for believing them. Given that we continue to be subject to 
various social and cultural influences, critical reflection continues to have 
a role to play in adult life. In the face of influences from advertising, the 
mass media, cultural pressures, and political propaganda, along with the 
seductive messages coming from all manner of experts, gurus, and 
demagogues, a capacity to be critical, to critically weigh up the claims 
and arguments we are presented with, remains vital if we are to maintain 
a degree of independence. Indeed, critical thinking is at the very heart of 
philosophy and is a key to our freedom.   
Adequate reflection is what differentiates philosophy from 
psychology, then, as well as from New Ages theories. Philosophy's 
difference from psychology lies in reflection, while its difference from 
New Age thought lies in adequacy. The New Age movement has become 
important for philosophers for its popularity, for its possible confusion 
with philosophy, and for the dangers for adequate thinking that the 
movement's views represent - almost the sole danger this otherwise 
peaceful and love-oriented movement represents. It is important for 
practical philosophers, then, to become acquainted with the main tenets 
of what is known today as the New Age movement2: Our inner states, 
attitudes and beliefs have a fundamental role in influencing our 
circumstances. The basic "stuff" of the cosmos is non-material "energy". 
The self is a unity of body, mind and spirit; by treating this unity as a 
whole many of our problems in life can be solved. By combining the 
ecological with the spiritual, we can repair the ills that we have inflicted 
on the earth. Each of us has a unique role in this holistic cosmos, and this 
role can be discovered through various procedures, ranging from 
divination to meditation. Each of us evolves over a succession of lives. 
These basic ideas are not available to us primarily through rational 
thinking but through other means. One way to arrive at these "truths" is 
through personal experience; another is through embracing the 
spirituality of various non-Western peoples. The specific path that any of 
                                                          
2 For the New Age sociology, see York (1995). 
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us will follow in order to gain these insights is an idiosyncratic one. Our 
experiences and feelings are the primary guides on our spiritual path, and 
since all individuals are different, many paths are valid. 
Despite the fragmented religiosity, there is a shared cosmology 
underlying numerous New Age books and many works of the esoteric 
tradition. It is a "hermetic idealism", idealist in the sense that it sees 
spiritual impulses rather than material causes as the primary mechanism 
operative in the cosmos (Hammer 2001, p. 51). It is hermetic through its 
implication that these spiritual impulses affect the material world by other 
means than through mundane chains of cause and effect, such as through 
Jungian synchronicities or through correspondences. Synchronicity is an 
"acausal connecting principle" which links seeming coincidences through 
deeper meanings. Correspondence is based on the idea that "as above so 
below"; in analogy with a hologram, man and the cosmos mirror each 
other (Hammer 2001, pp. 307-310). It is a cosmology with deep roots in 
Western esotericism. 
Epistemological criticisms target the New Age movement's use of 
science and the spiritual techniques it advocates. The latter is best 
represented by the attitudes of the Committee for the Scientific 
Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP), epitomized by 
Henry Gordon's unequivocal declaration that the field encompassed by 
the New Age is "nonsensical drivel" (Gordon, 1988, p. 28). The criticism 
of the New Age movement's use of science needs some elaboration. The 
guiding motivation of New Age scientists is the search for a new 
worldview. For this reason the term "New Age science" is actually a 
misnomer. Its real domain is not natural science, but philosophy of nature 
or Naturphilosophie. New Age's epistemology is therefore circular, 
according to Olav Hammer: 
 
Science is made to rhetorically support certain claims that are a priori doctrines 
within the Esoteric tradition. A specific view of the world is clothed in 
scientific terminology and expressed by means of carefully selected bits and 
pieces of science in what is essentially a scientistic [or pseudo-science] 
bricolage. Conversely, the underlying worldview is then said to be supported 
by the scientistic edifice thus constructed. In an age where science carries an 
enormous rhetorical weight, but is devoid of fundamentally appealing qualities 




such as goal, meaning and purpose, it remains tempting to claim scientific 
status for what are essentially religious beliefs. (Hammer 2001, pp. 339-360)3 
 
Epistemological criticism targets also the dogmatism of the movement's 
adherents. Joseph Chuman accuses New Agers of refusing, or being 
powerless, to correct their assumptions, thus committing the "error of 
solipsism, or the belief that the outside world is exclusively an object of 
our consciousness" (Chuman 1992, p. 20). Indeed, most New Agers think 
that one’s beliefs create one’s world, making the problem of verifiability 
redundant. New Agers are berated for turning off their critical faculties 
and for proclaiming "a metaphysical dualism with an exuberance and 
gusto that would have caused St. Augustine to blush", while the New Age 
is further charged with being "founded upon an utterly unsubstantiated 
metaphysics and a disreputable epistemology", and for "irresponsibly 
confusing imagination with fact" (Faber 1996, p. 58).  
Philosophers might opt for a minimal response to the New Age 
movement4 that involves construing Logic and Epistemology as practical 
fields, that could be taught in a way that seems relevant to most persons’ 
concerns. Teaching practical logic and critical thinking in that way 
outside the academe might be an example of a preventive action 
undertaken by philosophers. But how should such teaching be construed? 
I think that the goals of imparting critical thinking outside the 
academe are better served by an epistemology rooted in intellectual 
virtues, which addresses the cognitive set-up of the agent rather than 
episodes of cognitive activity in isolation. As Jay Wood argues, 
epistemology rooted in the virtues is an epistemology in the service of 
life. Intellectual virtues pertain to the entire range of our intellectual 
endeavors. In everyday life we have to address epistemological issues and 
display epistemological virtues such as wisdom, understanding, and 
foresight. Intellectual vices, on the contrary, include traits such as 
gullibility, superstition, closed-mindedness, and being prone to self-
serving beliefs (Wood 2000, p. 63). As interest in virtue epistemology has 
                                                          
3 See Hammer (2001) chapter 5: "Scientism as a language of faith", for a thorough explanation of the 
relationship New Age's theorists entertain with Modern Science. See also Hanegraaff (1996), chapter 
4. 
4 I have proposed a maximal response to the New Age movement as well as a critical analysis of its 
views in Amir (2009a). 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 2, 2011, pp. 41-65  
EPISTEMOLOGY AS A PRACTICAL ACTIVITY 47 




Virtue Epistemology  
 
Over three decades ago Roderick Chisholm observed that 'many of the 
characteristics which philosophers and others have thought peculiar to 
ethical statements also hold of epistemic statements' (Chisholm 1969, p. 
4). In the last twenty years, parallel to a revival of interest in virtue ethics, 
there has been an interest in virtue epistemology.  
Virtue theories make the properties of persons most fundamental, 
and then understand other normative properties in terms of these. We can 
exemplify this with virtue ethics. Different kinds of moral theory make 
different kinds of evaluation most fundamental. Consequentialist theories 
make the following valuations most fundamental: what things are good 
(valuable)? For example, Hedonistic utilitarianism claims that only 
pleasure is essentially good. The normative properties of actions, persons 
and lives are then understood in relation to this fundamental value. 
Deontological theories in ethics change this direction of analysis, making 
the following evaluations fundamental: which actions are right 
(appropriate, required, permitted)? Virtue theories, by contrast, make the 
following evaluations fundamental: What makes a person good (virtuous, 
admirable)? What makes a life worthwhile (desirable, enviable)? What 
sort of life constitutes human flourishing?  
Virtue theories in epistemology mirror the structure of virtue theories 
in ethics. They make the epistemically normative properties of persons 
fundamental, and understand other sorts of epistemically normative 
properties in terms of these. For example, a virtue theory tries to 
understand key normative notions such as justified belief, knowledge, and 
evidence in terms of the intellectual virtues.  
As characterized by David Solomon, virtue epistemology 'would not 
be belief-based; it would be agent- or end-based in that virtue would be 
more basic than belief. It would focus on the cognitive set-up of the agent 
rather than on episodes of cognitive activity in isolation.' (Solomon 2003, 




p. 80)5. In a similar vein, another virtue epistemologist suggests that 
instead of focusing on static states such as belief and the evaluation of 
these as justified or knowledge, we might instead focus on evaluating and 
regulating the activities of inquiry and deliberation and the role of virtues 
in such evaluation and regulation (Hookway 2003).  
Virtue theory in epistemology made its contemporary debut as a 
contribution to the debate between foundationalism and coherentism: 
Ernst Sosa argued that the sources of foundational knowledge could be 
understood as various noninferential cognitive powers (Sosa 1980; cf. 
1991). Coherence-seeking reason could also be understood as an 
intellectual virtue or power, but one that required other sources for its 
virtuous operation. The new focus on epistemic normativity, on what 
people ought to believe, brought with it a focus in intellectual agency as 
well. Epistemologists at the end of the century turned their attention to 
such issues as the relations between intellect and will, the cognitive role 
of the emotions, the social dimensions of intellectual agency, and the 
relations between intellectual agency and luck. Epistemology also saw a 
new focus on the intellectual virtues themselves, and a renewal interest in 
long neglected intellectual goods such as wisdom and understanding. 
These issues are of special importance for the Practice of Philosophy for 
they reflect questions that arise through experience in Consultancy.  
Different versions of virtue theory emerge depending on how the 
intellectual virtues are understood. At the end of the last century, there 
were two dominant understandings of the virtues that addressed a broad 
range of epistemological problems and issues. The first way of 
understanding the intellectual virtues follows Aristotle in making a strong 
distinction between intellectual virtues and moral virtues. Whereas the 
moral virtues are acquired traits of character, such as courage and 
temperance, the intellectual virtues are broad cognitive abilities. 
Epistemologists in the twentieth century added to Aristotle's list of 
cognitive powers, by including accurate perception, reliable memory, and 
various kinds of good reasoning (Sosa 1991; Goldman 1992; Plantinga 
1993; Greco 2000). The second way of understanding the intellectual 
                                                          
5 Among contemporary philosophers who have written on epistemology, a few seem to be moving in 
the direction of a radical virtue epistemology: Jonathan Knaving (1992), Linda Zagzebski (1996), and 
Alasdair McIntyre (1990). 
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virtues rejects Aristotle's distinction between intellectual virtues and 
moral virtues. On this second view, the intellectual virtues are also 
acquired character traits such as intellectual courage and intellectual 
carefulness (Code 1987; Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996). 
A virtue-based epistemology is preferable to a belief-based 
epistemology for the same reasons that a virtue-based moral theory is 
preferable to an act-based moral theory (cf. Statman 1997). A virtue-
based epistemology amends the contemporary neglect of epistemic 
values, such as understanding and wisdom, which have been very 
important in the history of philosophy (cf. Zabzebski 1996, p. 2, 43-51) 
and which are especially relevant to Philosophical Practice. Linda 
Zabzebski rightly notes that the most interesting parts of works from the 
virtue ethics tradition are often the detailed, perceptive treatments of 
specific virtues and vices. The same holds for epistemological virtues6.   
What are, then, the main intellectual virtues? What are the 
motivations that generate them? Are intellectual virtues different from 
moral virtues? Answers to these questions are important in order to 
understand whether intellectual virtues can be acquired and if they can, 
how it may be possible to develop intellectual virtueseffectively. Let's 
then begin with intellectual virtues along with their motivations within 
the history of Philosophy. 
 
 
                                                          
6 To take an example, in 'Humility and epistemic goods', Robert Roberts and Jay Wood (2003) 
provide a model for the kind of rich discussions of a specific virtue. Humble as opposed to vain 
people, they argue, are unconcerned with and inattentive to how they appear to others. This does not 
mean that humble people are ignorant of their good qualities, just that they are not particularly 
interested to be recognized for having these qualities. The reason for this is that their attention is 
focused on other, more important things. In the case of intellectual humility, one such thing would 
typically be the truth. Thus, for example, while vain persons might seek to hide their errors for fear of 
what others might think of them, the humble will be more concerned that any mistakes be brought to 
light so that they can correct their errors and get their inquiries back to track. Humble persons are not 
distinguished from arrogant persons by being unaware of or even unconcerned with entitlements. The 
distinction turns on what motivates the awareness or concern. Paradigmatic cases of arrogance 
involve an excessive interest in entitlements motivated by what Roberts and Wood call their ego-
exalting potency. In contrast, when humble people do have an interest in some entitlement, the 
interest is pure, in the sense that they are concerned with the entitlement because it serves some 
valuable purpose or project. Roberts and Wood close their essay by considering a wider variety of 
ways in which intellectual humility promotes the acquisition of epistemic goods.  
 




Intellectual Virtues and Motivations 
 
Intellectual virtues have been neglected in the history of philosophy, but 
there were discussions of them in the early modern period as part of the 
general critical examination of human perceptual and cognitive faculties 
that dominated that era. Both Hobbes and Spinoza connected the 
intellectual as well as the moral virtues with the passions, and both traced 
the source of these virtues to a single human motivation, the motivation 
for self-preservation or power. In the early part of the 20th century John 
Dewey stressed the place of the intellectual virtues in what he called 
'reflective thinking', arising from the desire to attain the goals of effective 
interaction with the world. Hobbes in Leviathan and Emerson in 'Intellect' 
(Essay 11) describe how a deficiency in the desire for truth leads to 
cognitive vices such as lack of autonomy, closed-mindedness, and 
dogmatism.  
Few philosophers have given positive directions on how to think that 
are intended to circumvent the pitfalls in forming beliefs. The emphasis 
has generally been on the mistakes. A well-known exception is Descartes 
in Rules for the Direction of the Mind, and another is Dewey in How We 
Think. Dewey lists in page 32 'attitudes' or intellectual virtues, among 
them open-mindedness, wholeheartedness, and responsibility. In the 
contemporary literature Laurence BonJour (1980) and Hilary Kornblith 
(1983) introduced a motivational element into the discussion of epistemic 
responsibility, defined by Kornblith as follows: 'An epistemically 
responsible agent desires to have true beliefs, and thus desires to have his 
beliefs produced by processes which lead to true beliefs; his actions are 
guided by these desires' (Kornblith 1983, p. 34).  
A more extensive treatment of epistemic virtue and its connection 
with motivation has been given by James Montmarquet (1986a; 1992; 
1993, chap. 2). He connects a large set of intellectual virtues with the 
desire for truth, claiming that these virtues are qualities a person who 
wants the truth would want to acquire. He classifies epistemic virtues as 
impartiality, or openness to the ideas of others; the virtues of intellectual 
sobriety, or the virtues of the careful inquirer who accepts only what is 
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warranted by the evidence, and the virtues of intellectual courage, which 
include perseverance and determination7. 
John Dewey is probably right is thinking that human beings are 
naturally credulous, which means that all too often learning the truth 
involves unlearning a falsehood. In her groundbreaking Intellectual 
Virtues, Linda Zagzebski rightly emphasizes that 'the difficulty in getting 
at the truth means that the right way to behave cognitively requires the 
motives needed when there are internal or external obstacles to overcome, 
the motives constitutive of autonomy, courage, perseverance, humility, 
fairness, open-mindedness, and other intellectual virtues. The motive of 
valuing truth is probably primary, but I suspect that for many categories 
of truth we are not going to get truth at all unless we have the motives 
that are constituents of these other virtues' (Zagzebski 2003, pp. 153-4). 
The problem of motivation is important for without an appropriate 
motivation one might be skeptical about the urge to combat wishful 
thinking, to go out of one's comfort zones, to live with uncertainty and to 
look actively for one's errors. 
 
 
Moral and Intellectual Virtues 
 
It is a commonplace of Western philosophy to regard human cognitive 
and feeling processes as distinct and relatively autonomous. At least it is 
usually thought that the former is capable of operating independently of 
the latter and that it ought to do so in the rational person, whether or not 
the latter is independent of the former. This part of our philosophical 
heritage is so strong that philosophers have maintained what Michael 
Stocker (1980) calls a 'purified view of the intellect' long after it was 
given up by cognitive psychologists and in spite of the fact that a few 
philosophers like Hume and James called attention to the close 
connection between believing and feeling.  
                                                          
7 Notice that there is an overlap between these sets of virtue and Dewey's. The major difference is in 
Dewey's virtue of wholeheartedness and Montmarquet's virtues of courage. Monmarquet calls the 
desire for truth 'epistemic conscientiousness' and argues that some intellectual virtues arise out of this 
desire. 




Related to the alleged independence of the cognitive and feeling 
processes is the alleged distinctness of the intellectual and the moral 
virtues, a position we owe to Aristotle. Although it is no longer usual to 
draw the distinction in precisely Aristotle's fashion, few philosophers 
have doubted that the division is deep and important. At any rate, few 
philosophers have opposed Aristotle's claim that such virtues as courage 
and temperance differ in nature from such qualities as wisdom and 
understanding. An exception was Spinoza, who connected both the 
passions and virtue with adequate ideas of God's nature, and who made 
understanding, an intellectual virtue, the key to all the virtues. Perhaps no 
other philosopher has unified the moral and intellectual virtues as solidly 
as Spinoza, who had the following to say about understanding: 
 
 Again, since this effort of the mind, by which the mind, in so far as it reasons 
endeavors to preserve its being, is nothing but the effort to understand…it 
follows…that this effort to understand is the primary and sole foundation of 
virtue, and that… we do not endeavor to understand things for the sake of any 
end, but, on the contrary, the mind, in so far as it reasons, can conceive nothing 
as being good for itself except that which conduces at understanding. (Spinoza, 
Ethics, Part. IV, prop. 26, parenthetical references removed). 
 
Another apparent exception was David Hume. Hume insisted that the 
distinction between the intellectual and the moral virtues is merely verbal, 
and that such qualities of intellect as wisdom, a capacious memory, 
keenness of insight, eloquence, prudence, penetration, discernment, and 
discretion should count as among a person's "moral" virtues since they 
are as much objects of praise as his honesty and courage (1983, App. 4). 
But since Hume also said it is merely a verbal matter whether the class of 
virtues includes all the human talents and the class of vices all the human 
defects, it is clear that he is using a much broader notion of virtue than 
that which dominated philosophy both before and after (ibid., App. 4, par. 
1). Hume's inclusion of intellectual virtues within the class of moral 
virtues therefore loses most of its drama. 
Julius Moravcsik has recently argued that Plato makes no sharp 
distinction between moral and non-moral virtues, whether in terms of the 
source of virtue or its function (Moravcsik 1992, p. 300). Aristotle, 
however, does make such a division. What's more, he makes a further 
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division within the intellectual virtues between those that aim at 
speculative insight or theoretical knowledge and those that pertain to 
practical thinking aiming at the production of artifacts or the performance 
of acts. The latter are art (techne) and practical wisdom (phronesis). 
When we consider how entrenched the distinction between moral and 
intellectual virtue is in Western philosophy, it is remarkable that 
Aristotle's grounds for distinguishing them are so unpersuasive8. Linda 
Zagzebski challenges these grounds, and in the process addresses the 
issue of distinguishing 'the moral from the intellectual virtues on the 
grounds that the former but not the latter involves the proper handling of 
feelings, whereas the latter but not the former involve the proper direction 
of cognitive activities.' (Zagzebski 1996, p. 146). 
It is true that many moral virtues, such as temperance, courage, and 
the virtues opposed to envy, jealousy, vengeance, and spite, are more 
directly related to the handling of strong feelings than are intellectual 
virtues, but this does not divide the class of virtues into two distinct 
categories. The moral virtue that many theorists consider central, namely, 
justice, has only a peripheral relationship with feelings, as do such virtues 
as honesty, sincerity, candor, and trustworthiness. On the other hand, 
intellectual virtues involve the proper use of the passion for truth, which, 
at least in some people, can be very strong indeed. There are feelings and 
desires that need to be restrained by the intellectual virtues.  
One of the strongest feelings people must overcome in their quest for 
knowledge in any field is the desire that some particular belief be true. 
The feelings that accompany prejudices can be strong; the desire to hold 
on to old beliefs can be strong; the desire that one's previously published 
views not be proven wrong can be strong. In each case there are desires 
or feelings that need to be restrained or redirected. Blaise Pascal saw the 
passion of self-love as weakening the love of truth and leading to self-
deception, the deception of others, and hypocrisy, vices, that are, at least 
in part, intellectual (Pascal 1961, p. 348). Plato recognized the need for 
natural feeling and moral rectitude in the apprehension of truth, 
particularly in moral matters, and gave a dramatic argument for their 
power in the seventh epistle (Plato, Letter VII, 344a-b, 1961). 
                                                          
8 See Linda Zagzebski's discussion (1996), part I, sec. 3 and Amir (2005b).  




One final problem with dividing the moral from the intellectual 
virtues, on the grounds that the former handle feeling states and the latter 
handle thinking states, is that there are states that are actually blends of 
thought and feeling. Curiosity, doubt, wonder, and awe are states of this 
kind, each of which can either aid or impede the desire for truth. 
Curiosity is interesting because both Augustine and Aquinas call curiosity 
a vice, whereas it would be much more common these days to think of 
curiosity as valuable.         
Feelings are involved in intellectual virtues, and intellectual virtues 
are involved in handling feelings, but their operation shows how blurry 
the distinction between intellectual and moral virtue really is. 
Intellectual prejudice, for example, is an intellectual vice, and the virtue 
that is its contrary is fair-mindedness, but clearly we think of prejudice 
as a moral failing and fair-mindedness as a morally good quality. It is 
possible that the intellectual form of prejudice and the moral form are 
the same vice, and the same point could apply to other cases in which an 
intellectual trait has the same name as a moral trait, such as humility, 
autonomy, integrity, perseverance, courage, and trustworthiness. 
William James has said in 'The Sentiment of Rationality' that faith is the 
same virtue in the intellectual realm as courage is in the moral realm 
(James 1937, p. 90).  
I will not take a stand here on whether a moral and an intellectual 
virtue can be the very same virtue. In any case, if there is a distinction 
between intellectual and moral virtue/vice, it cannot be on the grounds 
that the latter handles feelings and the former does not. Not only is the 
proper handling of feelings involved in intellectual as well as moral 
virtues, but almost all moral virtues include an aspect of proper 
perceptual and cognitive activity.  
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle gives a different reason for 
distinguishing the intellectual and the moral virtues. He claims there that 
they are learned or acquired in different ways. Intellectual virtues are 
qualities that can be taught, whereas moral virtues are habits that are 
acquired by practice and training (Aristotle 1941, chap. 2). James 
Wallace accepts this distinction and connects it with the distinction 
between skills and virtues (Wallace 1978, pp. 44-5).  
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 2, 2011, pp. 41-65  
EPISTEMOLOGY AS A PRACTICAL ACTIVITY 55 
I do not think, however, that intellectual virtues differ from moral 
virtues in the way in which they are acquired. Both require training 
through the imitation of virtuous persons and practice in acting 
virtuously. Both also involve handling certain feelings and acquiring the 
ability to like acting virtuously. Both also have stages in between vice 
and virtue consisting in akrasia or weakness of will and self-control. 
Some of the traditional moral virtues have more of a taming function than 
most of the traditional intellectual virtues, and that may explain why 
moral akrasia looms larger in our vocabulary of character than 
intellectual akrasia. Still, we have not yet seen any reason for dividing 
moral and intellectual virtues into distinct kinds.  
Moreover, the moral and intellectual virtues are intimately connected 
in their operation. There are both logical and causal connections between 
moral and intellectual virtues that are just as extensive and profound as 
the connections among various moral virtues. For example, honesty is on 
all accounts a moral virtue. It is a virtue that requires that one tells the 
truth. But it is not sufficient for honesty that a person tells whatever she 
happens to believe is the truth. An honest person is careful with the truth. 
She respects it and does her best to find it out, to preserve it, and to 
communicate it in a way that permits the hearer to believe the truth 
justifiably and with understanding. But this in turn requires that she have 
intellectual virtues that give her as high a degree of justification and 
understanding as possible. She must be attentive, take the trouble to be 
thorough and careful in weighing evidence, be intellectually and 
perceptually acute, especially in important matters, and so on, for all the 
intellectual virtues. The moral virtue of honesty, then, entails having 
intellectual virtues. 
The causal connections among intellectual and moral virtues are 
numerous. Envy, pride, and the urge to reinforce prejudices can easily 
inhibit the acquisition of intellectual virtues. A person without sufficient 
self-respect and an inordinate need to be liked by others may tend to 
intellectual conformity. An egoistic person will want to get her way, and 
this includes wanting to be right. She will therefore resist any 
demonstration of a mistake in her beliefs. If her belief is about a topic of 
contemporary debate, her egoism may lead her to read only those articles 
that support her own position and to discuss politics only with like-




minded individuals. Or if she is a philosopher, she may invite debate but 
will not fairly evaluate criticisms of her position and will invest most of 
her intellectual energy in winning the argument. She has, then, 
intellectual failings resulting from a moral vice. 
Furthermore, many moral virtues such as patience, perseverance, and 
courage are causally necessary for having intellectual virtues. In addition, 
there are virtues that apply both to the moral and the intellectual realm, 
and it is possible that that they are in fact the same virtue. The same point 
holds for such virtues as courage, humility, and discretion, all of which 
have both moral and intellectual forms. Vices such as laziness, prejudice, 
and obtuseness have both moral and intellectual forms.  
Two of the few important philosophers in the history of philosophy 
who discuss intellectual vice, Francis Bacon and John Locke associate 
intellectual failings with the passions and the moral vices. Both Bacon 
(1994, Book I, aphorisms 41- 44, 49, 52- 62) and Locke (1859, sec. 3, pp. 
208-9; also 1975, essay IV.20) emphasize the connections between moral 
and intellectual character in their enumerations of the ways things can go 
astray in human thinking. Recently, John Benson defines autonomy in a 
way that makes it both a moral and an intellectual virtue: 'The virtue of 
autonomy is a mean state of character with regard to reliance on one's 
own powers in acting, choosing, and forming opinions' (Benson 1987, p. 
205). He argues that autonomous moral thinking is closely parallel to 
autonomous theoretical thinking, the one being concerned with what 
should be done, the other with what is the case. He sees autonomy is a 
proper degree and kind of reliance on others, what is proper being 
determined by the end of the activity in which one is engaging. This 
virtue, Benson says, is closely allied to courage, as well as to humility, 
and it shows the connection between cognitive and volitional processes: 
'To be autonomous in one's thinking calls for intellectual skills, including 
the ability to judge when someone else knows better than yourself. But it 
calls also for the ability to control the emotions that prevent those skills 
from being properly exercised' (ibid., p. 213). 
Although the idea of intellectual virtue has been introduced into the 
epistemological literature by Ernest Sosa, he did no more than mention an 
association with virtue ethics. Subsequently 'virtue epistemology' has 
been used as another name for reliabilism (the view that the epistemic 
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goal is to form true beliefs and not to form false beliefs.) The works of 
Lorraine Code (1987) and James Montmarquet (1986) come closer to 
linking epistemology with virtue ethics, but neither one derives the 
concept of epistemic virtue from a background virtue ethics or pushes the 
similarities between intellectual virtue and moral virtue very far. 
Recently, Linda Zagzebski (1996) developed a virtue theory that is 
inclusive enough to handle the intellectual as well as the moral virtues 
within a single theory. She argued that intellectual virtues are, in fact, 
forms of moral virtue. It follows that intellectual virtue is properly the 
object of study of moral philosophy. This claim is intended not to reduce 
epistemic concepts to moral concepts in the way that has sometimes been 
attempted, but to extend the range of moral concepts to include the 
normative dimension of cognitive activity: normative epistemology is a 
branch of ethics.  
  
 
Furthering Intellectual Virtues 
 
Linda Zagzebski proposes a detailed method of developing intellectual 
virtues (Zagzebski 1996, pp. 152-5): it require training through the 
imitation of virtuous persons and practice in acting virtuously. It also 
involves handling certain feelings and acquiring the ability to like acting 
virtuously. Intellectual virtues also have stages in between vice and virtue 
consisting in akrasia or weakness of will and self-control.  While some 
forms of self-deception may be a vice, other forms may instead be a form 
of intellectual akrasia. In this case, one is aware that one has a vice and 
acquires the ability to tell how she should behave intellectually on the 
proper occasion. Moreover, she acquires the desire to be intellectually 
virtuous, but without doing so. This describes the state of intellectual 
akrasia, which is a state higher than vice. Some of the intellectual vices 
may have contrary vices, where one is an excess and the other a 
deficiency and the virtue is a mean between them. For example, there 
may be such a thing as intellectual rashness, the contrary of intellectual 
cowardice. In addition it may be possible to be overly thorough, overly 
sensitive to detail, overly cautious.   




The stage after akrasia is intellectual self-control. At this stage a 
person has to stop herself from accepting inadequate evidence or poor 
testimony or lapsing into ways of speaking and reasoning of which she 
disapproves. But, unlike the previous stage, she does it successfully. Still, 
she lacks the virtue because she finds it difficult to weigh evidence 
properly or judge authority reliably or reason with care. Her behavior 
may be correct, but it is not grounded in a 'firm and unchangeable 
character,' as Aristotle characterizes the person who truly possesses 
virtue. The final stage is the intellectual virtue. Zagzebski's examples 
include intellectual carefulness, perseverance, humility, vigor, flexibility, 
courage, and thoroughness, and the virtues opposed to wishful thinking, 
obtuseness and conformity. One of the most important intellectual virtues 
would be intellectual integrity.  
A modern list of intellectual vices could be the following: 
intellectual pride, negligence, idleness, cowardice, conformity, 
carelessness, rigidity, prejudice, wishful thinking, close-mindedness, 
insensitivity to detail, obtuseness, and lack of thoroughness. There is 
probably also a vice contrary to intellectual perseverance, which involves 
giving up too soon and may be a form of intellectual laziness or 
proneness to discouragement.   
Some of the advocates of a virtue epistemology are religious. For 
those who feel uncomfortable with the Christian content of some virtues 
and especially some vices, not to mention the use of the term “vice”, a 
non-religious epistemology of virtues may be developed along Karl 
Popper's and his followers' critical rationalism9. Popper states his main 
view of learning in The Open Society and its Enemies: 
 
All the known historical examples of human fallibility… are examples of the 
advance of our knowledge. Every discovery of a mistake constitutes a real 
advance in our knowledge… We can learn from our mistakes.  
 
 
                                                          
9 See Popper (1959, 1962, 1965, 1996), and his followers Joseph Agassi and Ian C. Jarvie (1987), for 
a method of improving thinking for scientists as well as laymen. See John Wettersten (1987), for 
crediting Otto Selz with the psychology, Karl Popper with the methodology and Joseph Agassi with 
the pedagogy associated with critical rationalism. John Wettersten argues that the unity between the 
three is both historical and logical. 
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This fundamental insight is, indeed, the basis of all epistemology and 
methodology; for it gives us a hint how to learn more systematically, how to 
advance more quickly… the hint, very simply, is that we must search for our 
mistakes… Criticism, it seems, is the only way we have of detecting our 
mistakes and of learning from them in a systematic way. (Popper, 1962, vol. II, 
pp. 375-6)  
 
Popper argues that Western civilization owes its rationalism and its faith 
in the rational unity of man and in the open society to the ancient Socratic 
and Christian belief in intellectual honesty and responsibility. He equates 
intellectual honesty with Socrates' call for care of the self and with self-
criticism. Later, he adds humility as an intellectual virtue (Popper 1962, 
vol. II, pp. 243-4, 190, 244). In his Conjectures and Refutations, he 
insists on the readiness to take chances as a requisite for critical 
rationalism10. In the introduction to The Myth of the Framework, he 
writes that 'critical rationalism is a way of thinking and even a way of 
living. It's a faith in peace, in humanity, in tolerance, in modesty, in 
trying to learn from one's mistakes, and in the possibilities of critical 
discussion… [it's] an appeal to reason.' (Popper 1996, p. xiii). 
Popper's epistemology of intellectual virtues should be developed as 
pedagogy. This has been partly done by his follower, Joseph Agassi. 
Critical of some of Popper's ideas on education, Agassi has been 
influenced by other views, such as Homer Lane's, Albert Einstein's, 
Leonard Nelson's and Imre Lakatos' group dynamics. The principal 
intellectual virtues he enhances are autonomy or self-reliance and 
nescience or awareness of one's ignorance. I describe his work and 
practice elsewhere11. 
In addition to Linda Zagzebski's program for developing intellectual 
virtues, Popper's implicit pedagogy, and his follower's practice, another 
interesting proposal is Christine McKinnon's (2003). She argues for the 
advantages of applying feminist ethics to epistemology. It allows for an 
account of a broader range of cases of knowing than those standardly 
discussed, in particular, knowledge of oneself and others. She argues that 
                                                          
10 See Popper (1963), pp. 36, 27. On critical rationalism as a method, see ibid., pp. vii, 14, 46, 56. 
11 See Amir (2010) for an account of Agassi's and Popper's pedagogies, Amir (2003; 2006a) for my 
own pedagogical views, Amir (2006b) for the importance of an epistemology of virtues in everyday 
life, and Amir (2009a) for the critical role of epistemology towards the New Age Movement. 




a virtue approach in epistemology is better suited to giving an account of 




The arguments in this article construe Philosophical Practice as a moral 
endeavor even when teaching critical thinking or furthering intellectual 
virtues. I think that Philosophical Practice is indeed a moral enterprise as 
all education is. It is mainly adult education, an offspring of the 
Enlightenment's ideals even in those post-modern times. The best 
philosophers can get and give are intellectual virtues. Is it possible to 
agree on important intellectual virtues? Is it possible to further 
intellectual virtues without unnecessary authority? I hope this article has 
explicitly put the question of intellectual virtues within Philosophical 
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